We present a North-South model of international trade in which di¤erentiated products are developed in the North. Sectors are populated by …nal-good producers who di¤er in productivity levels. Based on productivity and sectoral characteristics, …rms decide whether to integrate into the production of intermediate inputs or outsource them. In either case they have to decide from which country to source the inputs. Final-good producers and their suppliers must make relationship-speci…c investments, both in an integrated …rm and in an arm's-length relationship. We describe an equilibrium in which …rms with di¤erent productivity levels choose di¤erent ownership structures and supplier locations. We then study the e¤ects of within-sectoral heterogeneity and variations in industry characteristics on the relative prevalence of these organizational forms.
Introduction
A …rm that chooses to keep the production of an intermediate input within its boundaries can produce it at home or in a foreign country. When it keeps it at home, it engages in standard vertical integration. And when it makes it abroad, it engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) and intra-…rm trade. Alternatively, a …rm may choose to outsource an input in the home country or in a foreign country. When it buys the input at home, it engages in domestic outsourcing. And when it buys it abroad, it engages in foreign outsourcing, or arm's-length trade. Intel Corporation provides an example of the FDI strategy; it assembles most of its microchips in wholly-owned subsidiaries in China, Costa Rica, Malaysia, and the Philippines. On the other hand, Nike provides an example of the arm's-length import strategy; it subcontracts most of its manufacturing to independent producers in Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
Growth of international specialization has been a dominant feature of the international economy. Amongst the many examples that illustrate this trend, two are particularly telling. Citing Tempest (1996) , Feenstra (1998) illustrates Mattel's global sourcing strategy in the production of its star product, the Barbie doll. "Of the $2 export value for the dolls when they leave Hong Kong for the United States,"he writes, "about 35 cents covers Chinese labor, 65 cents covers the cost of materials,"-which are imported from Taiwan, Japan, and the United States -"and the remainder covers transportation and overheads, including pro…ts earned in Hong Kong" (pp.35-36) . The
World Trade Organization provides another example in its 1998 annual report. In the production of an "American" car, 30 percent of the car's value originates in Korea, 17.5 percent in Japan, 7.5 percent in Germany, 4 percent in Taiwan and Singapore, 2.5 percent in the U.K., and 1.5 percent in Ireland and Barbados. That is, "...only 37 percent of the production value... is generated in the United States"(p.36).
The increasing international disintegration of production is large enough to be no-ticed in aggregate statistics. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) use U.S. input-output tables to infer U.S. imports of intermediate inputs. They …nd that the share of imported intermediates increased from 5.3% of total U.S. intermediate purchases in 1972 to 11.6% in 1990. Campa and Goldberg (1997) …nd similar evidence for Canada and the U.K.
(but not for Japan). And Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) and Yeats (2001) show that international trade has grown faster in components than in …nal goods.
But how important is intra-…rm relative to arm's-length trade in intermediate inputs? A …rm-level data analysis is needed to answer this question, and no such analysis is available at this point in time. And despite the fact that the business press has stressed the spectacular growth of foreign outsourcing, Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2003) document an equally impressive growth of trade within multinational …rms.
Nevertheless, the fact that according to BEA data imports from foreign a¢ liates of U.S.-based …rms has fallen from 23.9% of total U.S. imports in 1977 to 16.1% in 1982, and remained roughly at this level until 1999, suggests that the growth of foreign outsourcing by U.S. …rms might have outpaced the growth of their foreign intra-…rm sourcing.
Other studies have documented a rise in the prevalence of domestic outsourcing by U.S. …rms. The Economist (1991) , Bamford (1994) and Abraham and Taylor (1996) , all report rising subcontracting in particular industries or activities. A systematic analysis of this trend is not available. Nevertheless, Fan and Lang (2000) provide indirect evidence of a decline in vertical integration. According to their data, the average number of four-digit SIC segments in which a U.S. publicly-traded manufacturing company operates, declined steadily from 2.72 in 1979 to 1.81 in 1997. This suggests that U.S. manufacturing …rms have become more specialized over time.
To address issues that arise from the choice of outsourcing versus integration and home versus foreign production, we need a theoretical framework in which companies make endogenous organizational choices. We propose such a framework in this paper by integrating two recent strands of the literature. Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003) have studied the e¤ects of within sectoral heterogeneity on the decisions of …rms to serve foreign markets. By allowing productivity to di¤er across …rms, they show that low-productivity …rms serve only the domestic market while high-productivity …rms also serve foreign markets.
Allowing for horizontal foreign direct investment, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple also show that, amongst the …rms that serve foreign markets, the more productive ones engage in foreign direct investment while the less productive …rms export, and a¢ liate sales relative to exports are larger in sectors with more productivity dispersion. Their approach emphasizes variations across …rms within industries, without addressing the organizational choices of …rms that need to acquire intermediate inputs. Grossman and Helpman (2002) address the choice between outsourcing and integration in a one-input general equilibrium framework, assuming that all …rms of a given type are equally productive. Their …rms face the friction of incomplete contracts in arm's-length relationships, which they weigh against the less-e¢ cient production of inputs in integrated companies. As a result, some sectors have only vertically integrated …rms while others have only disintegrated …rms. Grossman and Helpman identify sectoral characteristics that lead to one or the other equilibrium structure. This approach has been extended by Antràs (2003a) to a trading environment, by introducing two new features. First, the friction of incomplete contracts also exists within integrated …rms, and -as in Grossman and Hart (1986) -integration provides well de…ned property rights. However, these property rights may or may not give integration an advantage over outsourcing. Second, there are two inputs, one controlled by the …nal-good producer, the other by another supplier, inside or outside the …rm. The relative intensity of these inputs turns out to be an important determinant of the choice between integration and outsourcing.
By embodying this structure in a Helpman and Krugman (1985) style two-sector general equilibrium model of trading countries, Antràs shows that the sector that is relatively intensive in the input controlled by the …nal-good producer integrates, while the sector that is relatively intensive in the other input outsources. As a result, in the former sector there is intra-…rm trade in inputs, while in the latter sector there is arm's-length trade.
Building on this literature, we develop a theoretical model that combines the withinsectoral heterogeneity of Melitz (2003) with the structure of …rms in Antràs (2003a) .
The …nal-good producer controls the supply of headquarter services while a supplier of intermediate goods controls the quality and quantity of the intermediates. This allows us to study the impact of variations in productivity within sectors and of di¤erences in technological and organizational characteristics across sectors on international trade, foreign direct investment, and the organizational choices of …rms. In this framework trade, investment and organization are interdependent. The incentives created by di¤erent organizations, di¤erences in their …xed costs, and wage di¤erentials across countries shape the equilibrium organizational structure.
We show that in a world of two countries, North and South, in which …nal-good producers are based in the North, …nal-good producers who operate in the same sector but di¤er by productivity sort into integrated companies that produce inputs in the North (do not engage in foreign trade in inputs), integrated companies that produce inputs in the South (engage in FDI and intra-…rm trade), disintegrated companies that outsource in the North (do not engage in foreign trade in inputs), and disintegrated companies that outsource in the South (import inputs at arm's length). Moreover, we show that in sectors with low headquarter intensive …rms do not integrate; low-productivity …rms outsource in the North while high-productivity …rms outsource in the South. In sectors with high headquarter intensity all four organizational forms may exist in equilibrium, and, as in sectors with low headquarter intensity, high-productivity …rms import inputs while low-productivity …rms acquire them in the North. However, amongst the …rms that acquire inputs in the same country, the low-productivity …rms outsource while the high-productivity …rms insource. This implies that the least-productive …rms outsource in the North while the most productive …rms insource in the South via foreign direct investment.
We use the model to study the relative prevalence of di¤erent organizational forms.
We show how prevalence depends on the wage gap between the North and the South, the trading costs of intermediate inputs, the degree of productivity dispersion within a sector, the distribution of bargaining power, the size of the ownership advantage (which may be di¤erent in the two countries), and the intensity of headquarter services. Our model predicts that relatively more …nal-good producers rely on imported intermediates in sectors with higher productivity dispersion or lower headquarter intensity. And in sectors with integration and outsourcing, which are the sectors with high headquarter intensity, industries with higher productivity dispersion have relatively more …nal-good producers who integrate. This is true for a comparison of integration versus outsourcing in each of the countries. As a result, such sectors have more intra-…rm trade relative to arm's-length trade. These results illustrate the types of issues that can be addressed with our model. Our model is developed in the next section. In section 3 we characterize an industry's equilibrium. Then, in section 4, we describe the equilibrium sorting of …rms into di¤erent organizational forms, and we study in section 5 the prevalence of each mode of organization. This is also the section that examines the e¤ects of variations within and across sectors on the relative prevalence of organizational forms. Section 6 o¤ers a short summary with concluding comments.
The Model
Consider a world with two countries, the North and the South, and a unique factor of production, labor. The world is populated by a unit measure of consumers with identical preferences represented by:
where x 0 is consumption of a homogeneous good, X j is an index of aggregate consumption in sector j, and is a parameter. Aggregate consumption in sector j is a CES function
of the consumption of di¤erent varieties x j (i), where the range of i will be endogenously determined. The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties in a given sector is 1=(1 ). We assume that > , so that varieties within a sector are more substitutable for each other than they are substitutable for x 0 or for varieties from a di¤erent sector. This leads to the inverse demand function for each variety i in sector j:
Producers of di¤erentiated products face a perfectly elastic supply of labor in each one of the countries. We denote by w N the wage rate in the North and by w S the wage rate in the South. These wage rates are …xed and w N > w S . The assumption of …xed wage rates and a higher wage rate in the North can be justi…ed in general equilibrium by assuming that w`is the productivity of labor in producing x 0 in country`,`= N; S, and that labor supply is large enough in every country so that both countries produce
The demand parameters and are the same in every industry, which helps to focus attention on cross-sectoral di¤erences in technology and organizational costs. Our aim is to explore how di¤erences in technology interact with organizational choices in shaping industrial structure, trade ‡ows and FDI.
Only the North knows how to produce …nal-good varieties. To start producing a variety in sector j a …rm needs to bear a …xed cost of entry consisting of f E units of Northern labor. Upon paying this …xed cost, the unique producer of variety i in sector j draws a productivity level from a known distribution G ( ). 1 After observing this productivity level, the …nal-good producer decides whether to exit the market or start producing; in the latter case an additional …xed cost of organizing production needs to be incurred. As discussed below, this additional …xed cost is a function of the structure of ownership and the location of production.
Production of any …nal-good variety requires a combination of two variety-speci…c inputs, h j (i) and m j (i), which we associate with headquarter services and manufactured components, respectively. Output of every variety is a sector-speci…c CobbDouglas function of the inputs,
where the productivity parameter is …rm speci…c while the parameter j is sector speci…c. The larger is j the more intensive is the sector in headquarter services. pend on the organizational form and the location of M . All these costs, the sum of which we term …xed organizational costs, are in terms of Northern labor. We denote them by w N fk, where k is an index of the ownership structure and`is an index of the country in which M is located and the manufacturing of components takes place.
The ownership structure takes one of two forms: vertical integration V or outsourcing O. The location of M is in one of two sites: in the North N or in the South S.
Therefore k 2 fV; Og and`2 fN; Sg. An organizational form consists of an ownership structure and a location of M .
We assume that the …xed organizational costs are higher when M is located in the South regardless of ownership structure, because the …xed costs of search, monitoring, and communication are signi…cantly higher in the foreign country. Namely, f
We also assume that, given the location of M , the …xed organizational costs of a V -…rm are higher than the …xed organizational costs of an O-…rm. Namely, fV > fÒ for`= N; S. As a result of these assumptions the …xed organizational costs are ranked as follows:
We adopt this ordering in order to avoid a taxonomy of cases. There exists a tension between two considerations that a¤ect the ranking of fV and fÒ. On the one hand, the need to supervise the production of intermediate inputs in addition to other managerial tasks raises managerial overload and the …xed organizational costs of a V -…rm relative to an O-…rm. On the other hand, economies of scope in the management of diverse activities reduce the …xed organizational costs of a V -…rm relative to an O-…rm.
Our ordering amounts to assuming that managerial overload is more important than managerial economies of scope. Although we believe this assumption to be appropriate in many instances, and we therefore maintain it in the main analysis, we shall point out how some of the results change when fV < fÒ.
The setting is one of incomplete contracts. Final-good producers and manufacturingplant operators cannot sign ex-ante enforceable contracts specifying the purchase of specialized intermediate inputs for a certain price. In addition, the parties cannot write enforceable contracts contingent on the amount of labor hired or on the volume of sales revenues obtained when the …nal good is sold. One can use arguments of the type developed by Hart and Moore (1999) and Segal (1999) to justify this speci…cation.
Namely, that the parties cannot commit not to renegotiate an initial contract and that the precise nature of the required input is revealed only ex-post, and it is not veri…able by a third party. To simplify the analysis, we just impose these constraints on the contracting environment.
Because no enforceable contract can be signed ex-ante, …nal-good producers and manufacturing-plant operators bargain over the surplus from the relationship after the inputs have been produced. We model this ex-post bargaining as a Generalized Nash
Bargaining game in which the …nal-good producer obtains a fraction 2 (0; 1) of the ex-post gains from the relationship.
2
Following the property-rights approach to the theory of the …rm, we assume that ex-post bargaining takes place both under outsourcing and under integration. The distribution of surplus is sensitive, however, to the mode of organization. More speci…-cally, the outside option of H is assumed to be di¤erent when it owns the manufacturing plant than when it does not. In the latter case, a failure to reach an agreement on the distribution of the surplus leaves both parties with no income, because the inputs are tailored speci…cally to the other party in the transaction. However, by vertically integrating the production of components, H is e¤ectively buying the right to …re M This captures the notion that a contractual breach is likely to be more costly to H when M is in the South. More …guratively, we think of this assumption as re ‡ecting less corruption and better legal protection in the North. As is clear from the weak inequality, however, our results still hold when
The location of M and the mode of ownership are chosen ex-ante by H to maximize its pro…ts. There is an in…nitely elastic supply of M agents in each one of the countries.
H o¤ers a contract that seeks to attract a plant operator M . The contract includes 2 This speci…cation is similar to Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Antràs (2003a,b) . 3 The fact that the fraction of …nal-good production lost is independent of j greatly simpli…es the analysis, but it is not necessary for the qualitative results discussed below. 4 We maintain a distinction between N and S in order to show in Section 5 that these two parameters a¤ect the relative prevalence of di¤erent organizational forms in distinct ways.
an upfront fee for participation in the relationship that has to be paid by M . This fee can be positive or negative, i.e., the operator can make a payment to the …nal good producer or vice versa. The purpose of the fee is to secure the participation of M in the relationship at minimum cost to H. When the supply of M is in…nitely elastic, M 's pro…ts from the relationship net of the participation fee are equal in equilibrium to its ex-ante outside option. For simplicity, we set M 's ex-ante outside option equal to zero in both countries. It is, however, easy to extend the analysis to cases in which these outside options are positive and di¤erent in the North and in the South.
Equilibrium
Consider the payo¤s in the bargaining game for a pair of agents H and M in sector j. Since from now on we discuss a particular sector, we drop for simplicity the index j from all the variables. If the parties agree in the bargaining, the potential revenue from the sale of the …nal goods is R(i) = p(i)x(i), which, using (1) and (2), can be written as
.
If they fail to agree, however, the outside option of M is always 0 while that of H varies with the ownership structure and the location of components manufacturing.
When H outsources components, its outside option is also 0 regardless of the location of the manufacturing plant. In this event H gets R(i) while M gets (1 ) R(i).
Following Grossman and Hart (1986) , our assuptions imply that the …nal-good producer has more leverage under vertical integration. When the parties fail to reach an agreement, H can sell an amount `x (i) of output when its manufacturing plant is in country`, which yields the revenue ` R(i). The ex-post gains from trade are in this case
In the bargaining, H receives its outside option plus a fraction of the quasi-rents, i.e.,
Notice that the payo¤s in the bargaining game are proportional to the revenue.
Denoting by k R(i) the payo¤ of H under ownership structure k and the location of M in country`, the assumption N S implies that
That is, …nal-good producers are able to appropriate higher fractions of revenue under integration than under outsourcing, with this fraction being higher when integration takes place in the North. As in Grossman and Hart (1986) , integration gives H residual rights of control that allow it ex-post to use the inputs produced by M , which in turn enhances H's bargaining position. As a result, H gets a higher fraction of the revenue under integration.
Since the delivery of the inputs h (i) and m (i) is not contractible ex-ante, the parties choose their quantities noncooperatively; every supplier maximizes its own payo¤. In particular, H provides an amount of headquarter services that maximizes k R(i) w N h (i) while M provides an amount of components that maximizes 1 k R(i) w`m (i). Combining the …rst-order conditions of these two programs, using (4), the total value of the relationship, as measured by total operating pro…ts, can be expressed as:
where
Note that among the arguments of the pro…t function k ( ; X; ), the …rst one is …rm-speci…c while the others are industry-speci…c. Moreover, while is a parameter measuring the intensity of headquarter services, the consumption index X is endoge-nous to the industry but exogenous to the producer of a speci…c variety of the …nal good.
Our assumptions imply that the …nal-good producer chooses the organizational form that maximizes k ( ; X; ). To see why, recall that ex-ante, before a relationship between H and M has been formed, H o¤ers a contract designed to attract an M agent whose ex-ante outside option is zero, and the contract includes a participation fee, say t ? 0, that has to be paid by M . Under these circumstances the …nal-good producer of brand i expects to earn operating pro…ts
where fH k represents the component of the …xed costs that H has to bear when M is located in`and the ownership structure is k. On the other hand, M expects to earn operating pro…ts
with H, where fM k represents the component of the …xed costs that M has to bear.
By de…nition, fH k + fM k = fk. Next note that H has an incentive to raise t as much as possible, as long as the participation constraint M k 0 is satis…ed, because once a relationship between H and M is formed, the participation fee has no further e¤ects on the outcomes. As a result, the equilibrium value of t satis…es
Upon observing its productivity level , a …nal-good producer H chooses the ownership structure and the location of manufacturing that maximizes (6), or exits the industry and forfeits the …xed cost of entry w N f E . It is clear from (6) that the latter occurs whenever is below a threshold , denoted by 2 (0; 1), at which the operating pro…ts ( ; X; ) = max k2fV;Og;`2fN;Sg
equal zero. Namely, is implicitly de…ned by
This threshold productivity level depends on the sector's aggregate consumption index X, i.e., (X).
In solving the problem on the right-hand-side of (8), a …nal-good producer e¤ec-tively chooses the triplet k ; w`; fk that maximizes (6). It is straightforward to see that k ( ; X; ) is decreasing in both w`and fk. For this reason …nal-good producers prefer to organize production so as to minimize both variable and …xed costs. On account of variable costs, Southern manufacturing is preferred to Northern manufacturing regardless of the ownership structure (because w N > w S ). On account of …xed costs, however, the ranking of pro…t levels is the reverse of the ranking of …xed cost levels in (3).
Next note that if the …nal-good producer could freely choose its fraction of revenue
Although a higher k gives H a larger fraction of the revenue, it also induces M to produce fewer components. As a result, the …nal-good producer trades the choice of a larger fraction of the revenue for a smaller revenue level.
[
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The function ( ) is depicted by the solid curve in Figure 1 . It rises in ; (0) = 0 and (1) = 1. 5 To understand these properties, notice that in the ex-post bargaining neither H nor M appropriate the full marginal return to their investments in the supply of headquarter services and components, respectively. This leads them to underinvest in the provision of these inputs. Each party's severity of underinvestment is inversely related to the fraction of the surplus that it appropriates. Ex-ante e¢ ciency then requires giving a larger share of the revenue to the party undertaking the relatively 5 Notice also that it does not depend on factor prices and that it is less nonlinear the higher is . more important investment. As a result, the higher the intensity of headquarter services (the larger is ), the higher is the pro…t-maximizing fraction of the surplus accruing to the …nal-good producer (the higher is ).
Following Grossman and Hart (1986) , we do not allow a free ex-ante choice of the division rule of the surplus. The choice of ownership structure and the location of the manufacturing of components are the only instruments for a¤ecting the division rule, in the sense that the …nal-good producer is constrained to choose a k in the set Free entry ensures that, in equilibrium, the expected operating pro…ts of a potential entrant equal the …xed cost of entry. From the discussion above, a …rm that draws a productivity level below (X) chooses to exit, because its operating pro…ts are negative. On the other hand, …rms with (X) stay in the industry, and they choose organizational forms that maximize their pro…ts. Under the circumstances the free-entry condition can be expressed as
This condition provides an implicit solution to the sector's real consumption index X. Using the sector's consumption index, it is then possible to calculate all other variables of interest, such as the threshold productivity level of surviving entrants, the organizational forms of …nal-good producers with di¤erent productivity levels, and the number of entrants.
Organizational Forms
The choice of an organizational form faces two types of tensions. In terms of the location decision, variable costs are lower in the South, but …xed costs are higher there. In terms of the integration decision, insourcing entails higher …xed costs and gives H a larger fraction of the revenue. The latter feature does not necessarily bene…t H; although it raises H's incentive to supply headquarter services, it reduces M 's incentive to supply components. If the e¤ect on M 's incentives is strong enough, H's pro…ts may be lower under integration. These tradeo¤s are the central considerations in the choice of an organizational form.
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To simplify the discussion, we examine in this section organizational forms in only two types of sectors: those with relatively high headquarter intensity and those with relatively low headquarter intensity. Intermediate cases can be similarly analyzed.
We show below that …rms sort into organizational forms according to the patterns depicted in Figure 2 . First, in component-intensive sectors (i.e., low ) …rms do not integrate; high-productivity …rms outsource components in the South, low-productivity …rms outsource them in the North, and the least productive …rms exit. On the other hand, integration takes place in headquarter-intensive sectors (i.e., high ). The most productive …rms integrate in the South while somewhat less productive …rms outsource in the South. Firms with even lower productivity acquire components in the North, and amongst them the more productive integrate while the less productive outsource. The least productivity …rms exit. Note that surviving …rms with the lowest productivity outsource in the North in all sectors. And more generally, less productive …rms acquire components in the North while more productive …rms acquire them in the South.
We now derive these results. First consider a sector with low headquarter intensity , such that ( ) < 
It also is clear from Figure 3 As a result, all …rms with productivity below this threshold exit while all …rms with higher productivity levels outsource in the South. This describes the second type of equilibrium, in which no …rm outsources in the North.
We shall treat the equilibrium with outsourcing in both countries -depicted in Figure 3 -as the benchmark case. In this event the free entry condition (11), together with (6) and (8), imply
Equations (12) and (13) 
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We next consider a sector with high headquarter intensity , such that ( ) > N V .
We refer to it as a headquarter-intensive sector. A sector of this type is represented by Figure 1 . In this sector pro…ts are increasing in k , as shown by the arrows in the …gure. In a headquarter-intensive sector the marginal product of headquarter services is high, making underinvestment in h especially costly and integration especially attractive. This is re ‡ected in the slopes of the pro…t lines in Figure 4 ; V is steeper than Ò for`= N; S, because
Next compare the slopes of 
Given the orderings in (3) and (14), the orders of the intercepts and the slopes of the pro…t functions are as depicted in Figure 4 . Moreover, the …gure depicts our benchmark case for headquarter-intensive sectors, in which all four organizational forms exist in equilibrium, with outsourcing and insourcing taking place in both countries. Firms with productivity below H exit the industry, those with productivity between H and N HO outsource in the North, those with productivity between It is easy to see that either one of the …rst three organizational forms may not exist in equilibrium, but that the last one always exists in the absence of an upper bound on the support of G ( ). That is, there always exist high-productivity …nal-good producers who choose to insource components in the South. And more generally, the organizational forms that survive in equilibrium attract …rms according to the sorting pattern described in Figure 4 . If, for example, integration in the North and outsourcing in the South are viable, …rms that outsource in the South have higher productivity than …rms that insource in the North. But insourcing in the North would not be viable if its …xed organizational costs were too high.
In the next section, where we study variations in the relative prevalence of di¤erent organizational forms, we focus on the benchmark case depicted in Figure 4 , for which the cuto¤s are given by
We can also use the free entry condition (11) to derive an equation that is analogous to (13). This equation together with (15) can then be used to solve for the cuto¤s and the consumption index X.
Next consider the case in which the wage di¤erential is small, so that w N =w (14) is not preserved. In this case there are two possibilities only: either by low-productivity …rms, and insourcing in the North, chosen by high-productivity …rms. 7 We have shown that in our benchmark cases the equilibrium organizational forms follow the patterns depicted in Figure 2 . This sorting pattern di¤ers from the sorting pattern derived by Grossman and Helpman (2003) for organizational structures that use managerial incentives à la Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) . 8 Contrary to our results, in their model surviving low-productivity …rms acquire components in the 7 Our analysis has so far assumed that the ordering of the …xed costs (3) is satis…ed. Now suppose instead that the …xed costs of outsourcing are higher than the …xed costs of integration in each one of the countries, but that the …xed costs of integration in the South are higher than the …xed costs of outsourcing in the North, i.e., f
In addition, suppose that the ranking of the slopes of the pro…t functions (14) holds. Then, in a headquarter-intensive sector integration dominates outsourcing in both countries, because the …xed costs of integration are lower than the …xed costs of outsourcing and the pro…t line of an integrated …rm is steeper than the pro…t line of an outsourcing …rm. As a result, no …rm outsources and at most two organizational forms exist in equilibrium: low-productivity …rms insource in the North while high-productivity …rms insource in the South. On the other hand, in a component-intensive sector all four organizational forms can exist in equilibrium. In such an equilibrium the least productive …rms insource in the North, some more productive …rms outsource in the North, still higher-productivity …rms insource in the South, and the most productive …rms outsource in the South. These results illustrate the in ‡uence of …xed costs on the sorting patterns. Note, however, that independently of whether the …xed organizational costs of insourcing are higher than the …xed organizational costs of outsourcing, integration is more prevalent in headquarter-intensive sectors.
8 They did not distinguish between component-and headquarter-intensive sectors, however, although one can interpret their production technology as having = 0, i.e., a zero output elasticity with respect to headquarter services. For this reason a comparison of the cross-section variation of organizational forms that is based on the component-intensive and headquarter-intensive distinction cannot be made with their work.
South. Within this group less-productive …rms outsource while more-productivity …rms insource. While no one outsources inputs in the North, there exist modestly-high productive …rms that integrate in the North. However, the most-productive …rms, like the least-productive …rms, outsource in the South. Evidently, these alternative theories of the …rm predict di¤erent sorting patterns. Empirical evidence is needed to discriminate between them, but no such evidence is available for the time being. 
Prevalence of Organizational Forms
Our model predicts variations in organizational forms across …rms and industries. In the previous section we examined variations across …rms. Now we ask, How does the prevalence of organizational forms vary across industries? To answer this questions, we use the fraction of …rms that choose a particular organizational form as the measure of prevalence. We show in the appendix, however, that using instead the market share of these …rms as a measure of prevalence yields similar results.
Following Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003) , we choose G ( ) to be a Pareto distribution with shape k, i.e.,
where k is large enough to ensure a …nite variance of the size distribution of …rms. In this event the distribution of sales is also Pareto, which is consistent with the evidence (see Axtell (2001) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003) ). For concreteness we discuss only the benchmark cases of component-and headquarter-intensive sectors as de…ned in Section 4.
Component-intensive sector
Recall that in a component-intensive sector no …rm integrates. In the benchmark case depicted in Figure 3 , …rms with productivity below M exit the industry, those with productivity between M and N M O outsource in the North, and higher-productivity …rms outsource in the South.
Denote by
M O the fraction of active …rms that outsource in country`. Then
k . Substituting (12) into this expression yields
As is clear from equation (17) The model can easily be extended to incorporate transport costs for intermediate inputs.
If the shipment of components is subjected to melting-iceberg-type transport costs, then a fall in transport costs is very similar to a decline in the Southern wage rate. It follows that, as in Melitz (2003) , lower transport costs lead to more exit of low-productivity …rms, and to more prevalence of foreign outsourcing.
Second, consider an increase in the dispersion of productivity, which is represented by a decline of k. Since the expression in the brackets on the right hand side of (17) represents the ratio of the cuto¤s M = N M O and this ratio is smaller than one, a rise in dispersion raises the fraction of …rms that outsource in the South. 10 Third, note that the headquarter intensity also a¤ects the prevalence of outsourcing in the two countries. Since
, it follows that foreign outsourcing is less prevalent in sectors with higher headquarter intensity, because the less important are components in production the less important are the cost savings from outsourcing in the South compared to the higher …xed organizational costs of foreign outsourcing.
Finally, we have assumed for simplicity that an outsourcing …nal-good producer H appropriates a fraction of the surplus from its relationship with an input supplier M , irrespective of whether M is in the North or in the South. Imagine, however, a situation in which this fraction can di¤er across countries, and that H now gets a smaller fraction of the surplus from outsourcing in the South, but still higher than ( ), so that the sector remains component-intensive. This decline in H's bargaining power raises the pro…tability of outsourcing in the South, making foreign outsourcing more prevalent.
Headquarter-intensive sector
Four organizational forms exist in the benchmark case of a headquarter-intensive sector.
Ordered from low-to high-productivity, these are: outsourcing in the North, insourcing in the North, outsourcing in the South and insourcing in the South (see Figures 2 and   4) . We denote by H k the fraction of …rms that choose the organizational form (k;`), where k is the ownership structure and`is the location of M . Using the Pareto distribution (16) and the cuto¤s (15), these fractions are
We again …rst consider a lowering of the wage rate in the South. Lower wages in the South raise the pro…tability of foreign sourcing. In particular, (7) and Hanson (1996) point out that transport costs have declined and foreign assembly has increased both in-house and at arm's length. Furthermore, the BEA data suggest that the growth of foreign outsourcing might have outpaced that of foreign direct investment. Finally, as predicted by the model, U.S. domestic outsourcing seems to have increased relative to U.S. domestic insourcing.
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Second, we examine a decline in k, which represents an increase in the dispersion of productivity across …rms. It is evident from (18) Third, we consider variations in headquarter intensity. In sectors with higher headquarter intensity domestic outsourcing is favored relative to foreign outsourcing and integration is favored relative to outsourcing. That is, the ratios Finally, consider an increase in the primitive bargaining-power parameter . It can be shown that it reduces the ratios
The reason is that an increase in shifts the bargaining power in favor of H, regardless of ownership structure. As a result, outsourcing becomes more attractive to H. In this event the fraction of …rms that outsource components rises in each one of the countries. On the other hand, the share of …rms that insource components declines in each one of the countries. Moreover, the fraction of …rms that import components rises. That is, the fraction of …rms that outsource components in the South rises more than the fraction of …rms that insource components in the South declines. It follows that an increase in biases the acquisition of inputs towards imports on the one hand and towards outsourcing as opposed to integration on the other.
Concluding Comments
We have developed a theoretical framework for studying global sourcing strategies.
In our model, heterogeneous …nal-good producers choose organizational forms. That is, they choose ownership structures and locations for the production of intermediate inputs.
Headquarter services are always produced in the home country (the North).
Intermediate inputs can be produced at home or in the low-wage South, and the production of intermediates can be owned by the …nal-good producer or by an independent supplier.
Final-good producers and suppliers of components make relationship-speci…c investments, which are governed by imperfect contracts. In choosing between a domestic and a foreign supplier of parts, a …nal-good producer trades o¤ the bene…ts of lower variable costs in the South against the bene…ts of lower …xed costs in the North. On the other hand, in choosing between vertical integration and outsourcing, the …nal-good producer trades o¤ the bene…ts of ownership advantage from vertical integration against the bene…ts of better incentives for the independent supplier of parts. These tradeo¤s induce …rms with di¤erent productivity levels to sort by organizational form.
We show that the equilibrium sorting patterns depend on the wage di¤erential between the North and the South, on the ownership advantage in each one of the countries, on the distribution of the bargaining power between …nal-good producers and suppliers of components, and on the headquarter intensity of the technology.
A key result is that high-productivity …rms acquire intermediate inputs in the South while low-productivity …rms acquire them in the North. Amongst …rms that source their inputs in the same country, the low-productivity …rms outsource while the highproductivity …rms insource. In sectors with a very low intensity of headquarter services no …rm integrates; low-productivity …rms outsource at home while high-productivity …rms outsource abroad.
We also show how the prevalence of organizational forms, measured by the fraction of …rms that organize in the same way, depends on industry characteristics that shape the sorting pattern and on the degree of productivity dispersion across …rms.
Two results stand out. First, sectors with more productivity dispersion rely more on imported inputs, and within the group of headquarter-intensive sectors integration is more prevalent in sectors with more productivity dispersion. Second, the higher a sector's headquarter intensity the less it relies on imported inputs, and within the group of headquarter-intensive sectors integration is more prevalent in sectors with higher headquarter intensity.
Our model has also interesting implications for a widening of the wage gap between the North and the South, or a reduction of the trading costs of intermediate inputs (both changes produce similar results). As one would expect, reducing the costs of foreign sourcing raises the fraction of …rms that import intermediate inputs. In addition, however, it raises the fraction of …rms that outsource in each one of the countries. As a result, arm's-length trade rises relative to intra-…rm trade.
As is evident from these results, our model provides rich predictions about patterns of foreign trade and investment. Since we laid out the empirical motivation for this study in the introduction, it su¢ ces to point out in these concluding comments that our approach helps to better appreciate the complexity of trade and investment in a world in which …rms choose endogenously their organizational forms. It also should help in designing empirical studies of the ever evolving world trading system.
In the main text, we measured the relative prevalence of di¤erent organizational forms with the fraction of …nal-good varieties produced under each type of organization. In this appendix we show that the use of other measures yields similar results.
First consider the case of market shares, i.e., the fraction of industry sales captured by each organizational form. It is straightforward to show that …rm revenues can be expressed as:
Therefore in the benchmark component-intensive sector, the market share of foreign outsourcing is
When the productivity index is drawn from a Pareto distribution with the shape parameter k, the distribution of …rm sales is also Pareto with the shape parameter k = (1 ). Making use of the properties of the Pareto distribution, (A1) can be expressed as: that may or may not be more restrictive than the condition that de…nes the componentintensive sector (i.e., ( ) < ). 13 When < , a fall in the bargaining power in the South raises the market share of Southern outsourcing. When, instead, > , the e¤ect is ambiguous.
In the benchmark headquarter-intensive sector, sale revenues are X
where b R ( ) is given by:
and k ( ) is de…ned in (A2). The market share of each type of organizational form is then:
As is clear from equations (A3) Using output of each organizational form as a measure of relative prevalence also yields similar results. In particular, it can be shown that equations (A1)-(A4) apply to this case, with e k ( ) = k ( ) 1= replacing k ( ). The comparative statics are therefore similar to those for market shares. 
